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Abstract
Introduction: Cyclone Nargis hit Burma on May 2, 2008, killing over 138,000 and affecting at least 2.4 million
people. The Burmese military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), initially blocked international
aid to storm victims, forcing community-based organizations such as the Emergency Assistance Teams-Burma (EAT)
to fill the void, helping with cyclone relief and long-term reconstruction. Recognizing the need for independent
monitoring of the human rights situation in cyclone-affected areas, particularly given censorship over storm relief
coverage, EAT initiated such documentation efforts.
Methods: A human rights investigation was conducted to document selected human rights abuses that had
initially been reported to volunteers providing relief services in cyclone affected areas. Using participatory research
methods and qualitative, semi-structured interviews, EAT volunteers collected 103 testimonies from August 2008 to
June 2009; 42 from relief workers and 61 from storm survivors.
Results: One year after the storm, basic necessities such as food, potable water, and shelter remained insufficient
for many, a situation exacerbated by lack of support to help rebuild livelihoods and worsening household debt.
This precluded many survivors from being able to access healthcare services, which were inadequate even before
Cyclone Nargis. Aid efforts continued to be met with government restrictions and harassment, and relief workers
continued to face threats and fear of arrest. Abuses, including land confiscation and misappropriation of aid, were
reported during reconstruction, and tight government control over communication and information exchange
continued.
Conclusions: Basic needs of many cyclone survivors in the Irrawaddy Delta remained unmet over a year following
Cyclone Nargis. Official impediments to delivery of aid to storm survivors continued, including human rights
abrogations experienced by civilians during reconstruction efforts. Such issues remain unaddressed in official
assessments conducted in partnership with the SPDC. Private, community-based relief organizations like EAT are
well positioned and able to independently assess human rights conditions in response to complex humanitarian
emergencies such as Cyclone Nargis; efforts of this nature must be encouraged, particularly in settings where
human rights abuses have been documented and censorship is widespread.
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Introduction
Cyclone Nargis hit Burma’s Irrawaddy Delta on May 2,
2008 (Figure 1), killing over 138,000 and directly affect-
ing at least 2.4 million more[1,2]. A storm of this mag-
nitude poses challenges to any government; however,
Cyclone Nargis hit Burma (also known as Myanmar), a
country impoverished under decades of military rule
and with decimated health and education sectors, and
collectively rendered this ill-prepared country unable to
recover after a crisis of this scale [3-5]. Following the
cyclone, a humanitarian crisis ensued, one which argu-
ably became a complex humanitarian emergency (CHE),
defined as “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or
society where there is total or considerable breakdown
of authority resulting from internal or external conflict
and which requires an international response that goes
beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or
ongoing UN country program” [6-8]. The Burmese
regime, the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC), initially refused international aid; refused to lift
visa restrictions for humanitarian workers; and used
state resources, including troops, to support a scheduled
referendum on a military-backed constitution [9-13].
As international pressure mounted, the regime began
to allow some access by international aid agencies, parti-
cularly following an unprecedented visit to Burma by
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on May 22-23rd
[14]. Concurrently, the Tripartite Core Group (TCG),
composed of the UN, ASEAN, and the SPDC, was
formed and became the lead entity for the Nargis
Response[15].
The Emergency Assistance Teams Burma
While most international efforts to aid storm survivors
were stalled, local community-based organizations and
individuals were often the first-responders[16]. Within
three days of the storm’s landfall, the Emergency Assis-
tance Teams-Burma (EAT), a community-based network
of organizations and individuals, was formed and began
providing relief to cyclone survivors. EAT volunteers,
Figure 1 May 4th 2008, Cyclone Nargis path retraced with view of areas affected by Cyclone Nargis in the Irrawaddy Delta, Burma
(UNOSAT)[62].
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mostly cyclone survivors themselves and unaffiliated
with the regime, received aid donated by communities
living along the Thai-Burma border (in Burma or Thai-
land), as well as through international organizations that
sent aid through Thailand. Members of the relief teams,
eventually totaling 44 teams of several volunteers per
team, also received training in Thailand on emergency
response, food and water distribution, and basic first aid
provision, and with donated supplies were able to
quickly provide assistance to some of the hardest-hit
communities in the Irrawaddy, Rangoon, and Pegu Divi-
sions. Within the first three months, EAT delivered aid
to over 180,000 survivors living in 87 villages of 17 town-
ships, providing essential assistance such as clean water
and food, clothing, and shelter; assisting in proper dis-
posal of corpses; facilitating family reunification; and
providing emergency healthcare. In the second phase of
the EAT response, from August 1, 2008, to January 31,
2009, the teams continued to provide water and food
aid, but also focused on rehabilitation efforts, including
the rebuilding of homes and aiding in the re-establish-
ment of livelihoods, education, and health infrastructure.
Widespread violations of fundamental freedoms and
human rights perpetrated by the SPDC have been well-
documented [17-19]. Within weeks of the storm, inde-
pendent organizations [20-22] and the media began to
report human rights abuses in cyclone-affected areas,
including forced relocation of survivors, restrictions on
humanitarian aid, and confiscation and diversion of aid
[12,23-26]. Official assessments, including those con-
ducted with the SPDC, generally did not address these
concerns[16,27]. This reality convinced EAT and its part-
ners that an independent assessment of the human rights
situation in the affected areas was needed; information
vital both for informing comprehensive program plan-
ning and policy but also for community empowerment
and freedom to participate in reconstruction efforts.
In February 2009, EAT and its partners released a
report “After the Storm: Voices from the Delta,” docu-
menting human rights violations in the wake of Cyclone
Nargis[28]. The report generated significant controversy,
particularly with respect to the nature of the assessment
itself. EAT had performed a human rights assessment
using qualitative human rights methods, that included
in-depth interviews with relief workers and cyclone sur-
vivors. However, the report was widely viewed as an
assessment of the overall humanitarian response, for
which the methods used would have been inappropriate.
EAT members were misconstrued as being from the
Thai-Burma border areas or otherwise not recruited, as
they had been, from affected Delta communities. And
the report was represented as a call to limit humanitar-
ian assistance, although no such call was made in the
report or its recommendations[28].
The Later Phases of the Response
Human rights abuses continued to be reported during
the latter phases of the Nargis response. Independent
relief workers continued to be arrested and imprisoned,
including an additional five independent donors and ten
relief workers, detained in September-October 2009
[29-31]. Meanwhile, the regime’s contribution to relief
and rebuilding efforts continued to remain limited. In
September, 2009, the UN Human Settlements Pro-
gramme (UN-HABITAT) estimated that some 450,000
people in the Delta were still in dire need of shelter 18
months after the storm; the junta had constructed some
10,000 houses[32], international donors built some
25,000 houses, while the Burmese people themselves
had built 209,000[32,33]. Towards the end of 2009,
while the SPDC spent over $570 million on advanced
fighter jets from Russia [34,35], the TCG appealed for
$103 million for priority reconstruction initiatives, of
which only $88 million was pledged by the international
community [36-38].
Starting in May, 2009, EAT conducted an additional
round of interviews with relief workers and cyclone sur-
vivors to assess the human rights situation during the
later phases of the relief effort, one year after the storm.
The findings presented here include personal accounts
from interviews conducted during the earlier phases of
the response and from later rounds of data collection,
accounts not included in “After the Storm.”
Methods
A collaborative group was formed to conduct a commu-
nity-based human rights assessment, which included
EAT, the Mae Tao Clinic, local human rights organiza-
tions, and the Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health
and Human Rights, which contributed technical support
for training community investigators, developing survey
instruments, training in interview methods and conduct
of human subjects research, and provided support for
data analysis.
Qualitative research methods were used, as they allow
for detailed comparison of the experiences of survivors
and relief workers and, given the security situation and
the arrests of several prominent citizens engaged in
independent relief work [39-41], such methods were
also the only feasible approach for conducting human
rights investigations with minimal risk to participants
and interviewers. One-on-one interviews were therefore
employed to collect in-depth data from survivors and
relief workers. Three rounds of data collection were
undertaken, the first from June to September 2008, then
in October to November 2008, and May to June 2009,
to gather additional information on the later phases of
the response. Using purposive sampling, 103 in-depth
interviews, 42 with relief workers and 61 with cyclone
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survivors, were conducted in Burma’s Irrawaddy and
Rangoon Divisions as well as along the border with
Thailand. In all, 87 communities in 17 townships were
represented by at least one interview.
Interviewers were recruited from members of EAT’s
community networks that were providing emergency
relief inside the Irrawaddy Delta after the cyclone. Inter-
viewers were recruited on a voluntary basis and were
chosen for their knowledge of and access to the com-
munities, particularly those hardest hit.
The interview format utilized participatory research
methods and in-depth qualitative interviews focusing on
selected rights abuses which were identified during pre-
liminary formative research[42,43]. The selected relief
workers were trained in Thailand to conduct interviews.
Trainings focused on case finding, interviewee confiden-
tiality and security, informed consent, screening candi-
dates for interviews, open-ended qualitative interviewing
skills, accurate and secure data gathering techniques,
contact-based sampling methods, and human rights
principles. Refresher training sessions occurred regularly,
as relief workers returned to the Thai border for re-sup-
ply of aid materials. Local human rights organizations,
including the Karen Human Rights Group, provided
assistance during the trainings.
The qualitative interview format for the relief worker
interviews was developed for the assessment based on
initial key informant interviews with relief workers dur-
ing the first month after the cyclone. Interview domains
were developed along with specific probes through an
iterative process that incorporated input from study team
members and other leaders from organizations operating
in this environment. The guide was then piloted with
several local team members and refined for clarity, ease
of use, and brevity. The interview guides and consent
scripts were translated into the three most commonly
used languages in survey sites: Burmese, Skaw- and Pwo-
Karen. Domains covered internal displacement; discrimi-
nation in provision of relief; community responses; and
personal security and logistical concerns. Later, domains
were added to explore topics of child labor, security and
other concerns related to women and debt, as these
issues emerged during recovery efforts.
A similar process was used to generate a qualitative
instrument for interviews with Nargis survivors. The
EAT team decided that only adults (18 years or older)
would be interviewed, as it was difficult to assess the
agency and protection for children in Burma. A semi-
structured instrument that utilized a flexible set of
open-ended probes was developed to elicit in-depth
information about human rights concerns. Domains for
survivor interviews included questions about the survi-
vor and his/her family before the cyclone; experience
during the cyclone; knowledge or warning of the
impending cyclone; the situation and events experienced
by the survivor and his/her family immediately post-
landfall until the day of the interview; negative experi-
ences; and plans for the future. During the second phase
of the assessment, much of the survivor interviews in
the affected areas focused on probing further into perso-
nal experiences of human rights abrogation and protec-
tion. Interviewers were trained to utilize pre-designed
screening questions to aid in the identification of candi-
dates with detailed primary information regarding any
one of the human rights abuses. Once potential candi-
dates were identified and oral informed consent had
been obtained, the confidential and anonymous inter-
view was conducted in a secure location and the set of
open-ended probes for the relevant domain(s) were then
employed by the interviewer to continue gathering
detailed and sensitive information. During the interview
process, detailed questions or probes were used to elicit
further details of experiences, a process that serves both
to gather the most information possible as well as to
ensure internal consistence and to differentiate personal
experiences from hearsay.
Because of the risk associated with collecting this
information in Burma, interviewers took numerous pre-
cautionary measures to ensure the protection of both
the participants and themselves. No personal identifying
information was collected and, prior to participation,
oral scripts to obtain verbal consent were used- as
opposed to signed consent forms- to prevent uninten-
tional revelation to outsiders of an individual’s participa-
tion in the study. Interviews were recorded using a
portable digital recording device after obtaining the par-
ticipant’s explicit permission regarding its use and after
providing basic instructions to omit details that might
reveal the identities of the survivors or their commu-
nities during the interview. Interviews were identified by
the date and location of the interview, logged in a sim-
ple string of numeric codes, a method that also ensured
protection of interviewer and interviewee.
Interview data was sent to a central location where they
were translated into English, transcribed, and re-checked
for accuracy by bilingual EAT staff. The English language
transcripts were then analyzed by the JHU team using
qualitative analytic approaches. The data from the inter-
views were analyzed based on relevant human rights
themes, chronology of the event(s), location, demo-
graphics of affected communities, demographic informa-
tion of interviewee, and details of government, military
and NGO involvement. Data were then analyzed for
widespread patterns and differences using a modified
qualitative matrix. At the time of final reporting, any
additional information that was believed to potentially
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place the interviewer or interviewee at risk of identifica-
tion was removed to further ensure protection.
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health, and by the Burma
Medical Association’s Ethical Committee.
Results
In total, EAT teams conducted 103 in-depth qualitative
interviews; 42 were with relief workers from cyclone-
affected areas, 61 were with Nargis survivors. Of these,
nine relief worker interviews and four survivor inter-
views were conducted in Thailand during the latest
round of data collection, in May-June 2009. Names of
participants and villages, as well as other identifiers that
were revealed during interviews have been removed for
the security of participants and members of their com-
munities. Findings from these interviews are summar-
ized in Table 1.
Needs for Food, Water, and Shelter following
the cyclone
A year after the Cyclone, respondents reported that
basic necessities remained unavailable for many[44].
The people in my area still need boats and fishing
nets. We also need some small shops in order to sell
noodles and basic supplies.....We lost everything in
the whole village - our house, our belongings, our
buffalos, and cows... So now we need these things to
rebuild. Survivor, Female, from Labutta Township,
Irrawaddy Division (May 3, 2009)
Food supplies, particularly agricultural outputs, were
insufficient in quantity and quality due to the immediate
destruction of land and crops by the cyclone and exa-
cerbated by the loss of farming equipment, increasing
debt, and interruption of labor, as survivors were forced
to prioritize other needs, such as acquiring water or
rebuilding shelters, over farming.
One of the small villages that I visited, I saw that
they didn’t have any assistance from anyone so they
still needed houses. And for the farmers, they also
need farming tools and other things like paddy seeds
and petrol. The people also need food because they
cannot survive on their own now and some people
are still without a job. They have a lot of difficulty
for getting food. The reason they don’t have houses
yet is that there is not an organization working there
or a donor. Also, they are busy searching for food so
they don’t have time to work on building houses and
also there is no extra money for building the houses.
Relief worker, Female, from Labutta Township,
Irrawaddy Division (May 8, 2009)
...they [cyclone survivors] are daily workers, finding
enough food is a big problem. They don’t have
money to buy food so sometimes they have to borrow
from the other houses. The main issue is that they
don’t have money to buy the food that is available in
Table 1 Summary of findings from interviews with cyclone survivors and relief workers:
Domain Concern
Basic necessities - Survivors lacked clean water and food
- Distance and cost of obtaining and transporting were challenges that had to be met, often at the sacrifice of
meeting other needs
- Shelters and new homes were inadequate; many residents were still homeless or in temporary housing
- Concerned with the stability and protection provided by the new structures
Health - Diarrhea and illnesses related to water shortages persisted
- Noted psychological disorders associated with traumatic event of the storm and loss
- Basic health services remained insufficient (a reality even before the cyclone)
Government interference (direct
and indirect)
- Check-points were in place along routes into the Delta during the early phases of response
- “Fees” were charged to access disaster areas
- Travel restrictions occurred
- Aid workers were extensively monitored
- Relief workers were required to give aid directly to the authorities
- Relief and reconstruction materials were misappropriated
Security Concerns - Intimidation, abuse, and fear of arrest of relief workers
- Security concerns further obstructed the delivery of aid to cyclone victims
Information - Challenges and security concerns were associated with collecting information
- Needs assessments and coordination of relief activities particularly were hampered by inability to
independently collect data and communicate
- Information released through the state-controlled media outlets minimized the extent of the disaster and
needs of the victims
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the village. Relief Worker, Female, from Labutta
Township, Irrawaddy Division (May 8, 2009)
Access to potable water remained problematic; a con-
sequence of wells and ponds still contaminated by salt-
water as well as the end of the monsoon rains.
For water, we have to go to a village that is one day
walking away. We have to stay in that village one
night and then come back. There is a big problem
for getting water and food in our village. We have to
search for a long time for some plants that we can
sell and get other things, other food....Even now,
even today we still have to get water this way. Survi-
vor, Female, from Labutta Township, Irrawaddy
Division (May 3, 2009)
For the water, they tried to repair a pump but 1
week after they fixed it, they found out that the
water was not good so this affected their health.
Also, there is a water purifications machine, but this
is not working well either...Now we do a water pro-
ject and the authorities and village leaders say that
the emergency period is over so they said that we
don’t need to support these livelihoods projects.
Relief Worker, Female, working in Rangoon,
Dedaye, Labutta and Mawlamyinegyun (May 5,
2009)
The emergency need right now is water. They do
not have water in the village so they must [travel] by
boat 6 hours one way in order to get water. We also
have to purchase the water from Labutta. For these
people, they are the ones who are poor already and
so they cannot afford it and it is really difficult for
them. They must spend money on the water so it is
difficult for them to purchase enough food. Relief
Worker, Male, working in Labutta Township,
Irrawaddy Division (May 5, 2009)
Shelters remained inadequate, and many residents
were still homeless or living in temporary housing.
Among those who had their houses rebuilt or were pro-
vided with new ones, several voiced concerns for the
stability and protection provided by the new structures.
In my village about half of the people have been able
to rebuild their houses, but the other half have not
been able to. The government said they would build
the houses for the village, but what they distributed
was not enough. Some people were able to build,
but not everyone. For the people who did not
receive support they had to make a shelter out of
bamboo and tarpaulin, but it is not safe enough to
protect them. Even the people who received housing,
though, the houses are not of good quality. When it
rains, the roof leaks and also the walls cannot pro-
tect against the rain. So, both the people who have
houses and temporary shelters are wet from the rain.
Relief Worker, Female, Working in Labutta (May
5, 2009)
They [cyclone survivors] have not been able to build
their houses because they do not have enough
money to rebuild. For the food, they don’t have
enough money to buy enough food, because they are
daily workers. For the people who have not build a
new house yet, some build their houses in another
person’s garden. Some other people built shelters
out of tarpaulin. But, these houses are too hot and
when it rains it does not protect them from the rain.
Survivor, Female, from Kungyangon Township in
Rangoon Division (May 4, 2009)
A year after the storm, issues such as diarrhea and ill-
nesses related to water shortages, as well as psychologi-
cal disorders, were noted[45]. Basic health services
remained insufficient for many survivors, a reality even
before the cyclone. Local relief workers and clergy often
received training and provided basic health services and,
in some cases, medicine when this was possible.
But we see a lot of children with diarrhea. The villa-
gers cannot do anything when the child has diarrhea.
They would need to go all the way to Labutta
because there is nothing to treat them within our
village. Survivor, Female, from Labutta Township,
Irrawaddy Division (May 3, 2009)
For medicine, even though we support them, we
don’t have enough medicine to meet their needs.
Also, there are no health workers, nurses or mid-
wives in these villages so the people have to go to
another village to get services. Even though we can-
not provide a doctor, we work with a doctor to get
the medicine and learn how to use it and then pro-
vide it to them. Relief Worker, Female, Working
in Rangoon, Dedaye, Labutta and Mawlamyine-
gyun (May 5, 2009)
For the women, the pregnant women, we don’t have
enough medicine to take care of them very effec-
tively. We can only talk with them, but we cannot
provide treatment and this makes it difficult for us
as health workers and also for the women. To go to
the township, it is too far to go. Most of the people
have to stay in the village. By boat it is 7 hours. In
my village we do not have a clinic, but there are the
three of us health workers...We have a public health
team. These people provide training and information
to the people about boiling their water and what to
do when they have diarrhea. They also show them
how to use ORS properly. These people just
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organized by themselves to do this, they are not an
organization...For us, we are from the rural areas
and travel is very difficult so I hope someone will
help us by providing donations for medicine and
assisting us with rehabilitation. The medicine is the
most important because it is very difficult to travel
to the township, especially during the rainy season.
We have to cross the sea to get to the township and
it is difficult and dangerous. Relief Worker, Female,
Working in Labutta Township, Irrawaddy Divi-
sion (May 5, 2009)
Some children in the area also have a lot of cough-
ing and I think it is TB. They don’t have any place
to go and get tested to see if it’s TB, though. These
places are so far away, too far away. It takes one day
to walk there, the whole day. Some of the children
cough for 1-2 months every day and then the par-
ents make the trip to the town for testing. The situa-
tion now and before Nargis is different because now
they cannot go to the township. Even if they have a
clinic in the village, there are not enough health
workers and doctors. Even if you want to go to that
clinic, you have to pay 5,000 kyat [approximately $4
USD] for one visit, but this does not include the
medicine costs... But, it is also the case that before
Nargis there were no health workers or doctors...In
our village, there are 2 clinics. One from the govern-
ment, and one private. If you want to go there, you
have to pay. There are no free services. Most people
are not able to go. Most people cannot afford to
pay. If it is not serious, they do not go to the clinics,
they just buy some medicine from the pharmacy or
small shop, but this is not western medicine, it is
only traditional medicine.The situation is the same
now as it was before [Cyclone Nargis]. Survivor,
male, from Kungyangon Township, Rangoon
Division (May 3, 2009)
The health situation does not seem to be so bad. It
is the same situation as before the cyclone. There is
no clinic in our village so people have to travel
about 20 minutes by trishaw. If there is a big pro-
blem then people go there, but if it’s not to major
then we get treatment from one of the monks.
Relief Worker, Female, Working in Rangoon
Division (May 4, 2009)
Government Interference in Relief Efforts
Although delivery of aid was hampered by difficulties in
physical access and travel, government interference,
direct and indirect, was also frequently reported. These
included travel restrictions, check-points along routes
into the Delta, “fees” to access disaster areas, extensive
monitoring of aid workers, and the demand for aid to
be given directly to the authorities. Many of these chal-
lenges persisted into 2009.
Around February or March 2009 the authorities
asked us where we got permission to work in these
areas and who supported us. Even though we are a
social group, we had to lie and say we were from
[name deleted] because the [name deleted] gave us
support to do anti-trafficking work. They support
funds for the livelihoods project and the anti-traf-
ficking training work. But, the authorities told us
that the emergency period is over and most of the
NGO already went back so when we work there the
authorities ask us many questions.... Even though
they don’t want us to do this work and even though
the support has stopped from [name deleted] we still
do this work and when they ask us about our work
we lie and say we are with [name deleted]. Now we
only receive support from our friends outside of
Burma We have to do this for our safety. We have
to do this because if the authorities found out
exactly what we are doing it would depend on the
authorities what happens to us... For me, I am not
afraid of being arrested, but I want to continue to
do this work and complete my work. If they know
about our project and stop us then we cannot do
this work. I have a good relationship with the villa-
gers and for their long-term plan we have already
arranged everything and we need to work together.
When we go there we understand each other and
work together. I have heard of people being arrested
for doing similar work, but I don’t know any of the
exact details. Relief Worker, Female, Working in
Yangon, Dedaye, Labutta and Mawlamyinegyun.
(May 5, 2009)
Now INGO work is still happening, but it is a very
restricted condition. When we first started working,
there were no INGOs there. They came about 1.5
months after the cyclone. But now, their movement
is restricted, especially if they don’t have an MOU
[Memorandum of Understanding, with the Burmese
government], so they have to draw back. All 10 vil-
lages that we work in have INGOs present, but they
come less often. We can move quickly and freely,
but the security situation for us is worse than for
those with an MOU. They have to wait for permis-
sion to do things, but we just go and do them, but
we have to be careful. We coordinate and talk with
INGOs, though. There are coordination meetings
that take place. For things like human rights viola-
tion issues, though, we talk about this outside of the
meeting because we have to be careful of security
and who is listening. The INGOs seem to listen to
the problems, but they don’t take any action. We
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have tried for registration, but because we are a [eth-
nicity deleted] group and a women’s group, we think
that is why we have been denied. INGOs are allowed
to openly coordinate with each other and with the
government, but we have no direct communication
with the government and we are restricted in how
we can work with the INGOs because we have to
keep quiet. Relief Worker, Female, working in
Dedaye, Moulmeingyun, and Labutta (May 14,
2009)
Confiscation of Relief Supplies
Concerns about misappropriation of relief and recon-
struction materials continued in 2009:
For these people, even though we heard that the
NGOs will donate houses, they cannot go directly to
the village, they have to go through the government
and the government also does the contract to have
the houses built so the house that were built were
not enough for everyone in the village. Even the
NGO made it to our village; they only provided a
small amount of food and clothing support, but
what the village really needs are support for their
livelihood. Relief Worker, Male, working in
Labutta Township, Irrawaddy Division (May 5,
2009)
Last year there were NGOs working in this area, but
they left this year in March... Around April 15th or
16th, I didn’t see any organizations at that time.
This village still needs support from the NGO, but
the NGO said they cannot do this work freely and
directly to the beneficiary and they have to work
through the government so they don’t want to come
again. People from the authorities are very involved
in the contract with the NGOs [names of 5 INGOs
deleted]. In the places I work, they stopped food
support in February 2009. For the villagers, even
though know that the NGOs support them, but they
don’t get it or they get only small things. The house
that I have, it was cheaper than the contract that the
government had and built and my house is still in
good condition, while the house provided by the
government is already damaged. Relief Worker,
Male, working in Labutta Township, Irrawaddy
Division (May 5, 2009)
The other example was when some people donated
clothes, the good quality ones were taken by the vil-
lage leader to give to his family and friends. The
ones of poor quality were given to the poor people.
Also, when diesel was given to the village, it was
supposed to be given to the whole village, but actu-
ally he only gave it to the farmer and then sold the
remaining to other villages to make money. the vil-
lage leaders are not chosen by the people in this
area, they are appointed by the government and are
part of the government. In almost all of the villages
I have visited, I see corruption on the part of the vil-
lage leader. Relief Worker, Female, working in
Labutta Township, Irrawaddy Division (May 8,
2009)
I saw that all of the assistance had to go through the
government, it cannot go directly. Because of this,
when it actually reaches the community, there is
some missing. One example is for the housing, the
supplies were donated and then the government
took the supplies and hired a company to build the
houses. The authorities told the donor it will cost
2,000,000 kyat [approximately $1667 USD], but actu-
ally it costs only 500,000 [approximately $417 USD].
The government charges the donor for 2,000,000
but only spends 500,000 on the house and keeps the
rest... Relief worker, Male, Working in Labutta,
Bogale, and Mawlamyinegyun Townships, Irra-
waddy Division. (May 8, 2009)
Arrest of Relief Workers and Security Concerns
Obstruction in the delivery of aid to cyclone victims also
occurred as a result of intimidation, abuse, and arrest of
relief workers, especially private volunteers. Several
interviews revealed that relief workers often had to pro-
vide some form of bribery in order to work.
After one month, they came to the village, saw my
supplies and started asking - they sent my informa-
tion to Yangon [Rangoon] to investigate me. They
were asking why there were so many supplies. They
think it was anti-government. So I left; I don’t like
prison. Relief Worker, Male, Physician, working
in Pyapon Township, Irrawaddy Division. (August
20, 2008)
Before I go, I always plan for my security and check
to make sure everything is ok and then I go to do
work. If I see some problem, authorities, I already
have a plan of what I have to say or what I have to
do. For this, one problem is if they check us. When
we distribute assistance, we cannot let them see this
assistance and we go quietly. They don’t know I do
relief work in this area. If you can explain very
clearly, maybe it will be ok, but if I am caught I
could be arrested. Relief Worker, Male, working in
Labutta Township, Irrawaddy Division (May 5,
2009)
Only the village leader knew about this youth group
and their support so there is no problem. The village
leader does not talk about their work to the other
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authorities. He does not explain how the community
works to support themselves. I think that if the
authorities know about this, the situation could be
worse. I think that the authorities don’t like when
people organize themselves or make some kind of
group... The people in the village think that it is best
if I get permission and maybe they won’t know
where I have studied and worked, and then they will
give permission for me to do this work. My cousin
advised me to give the authorities some money to
make everything okay. When I go back to work, I
have a plan to talk to the authorities. My cousin is
one of the clerks from that area so she knows the
situation very well and she offered to take me to the
authorities. She said we will go together and give
some presents to the authorities and then they will
let me go to the village. Relief Worker, Female,
Working in Labutta Township, Irrawaddy Divi-
sion (May 8, 2009)
For my staff, they face a lot of problems in their
work. It is difficult for them to travel and also they
have problems with security. There are also pro-
blems with poor communication, threats to the
group, and also long travel. On April 16 in [name
deleted], a soldier from LIB [Light Infantry Batta-
lion] 613 severely beat one of my relief worker
staff. The soldier said that this was because he
didn’t have travel permission. But we have been
working there for years and also since the cyclone
and no one mentioned about needing travel per-
mission for people from there. There was no
announcement. He was severely beaten especially
around his head and face. This town is a military
check point. But before the cyclone it was not.
Before the cyclone there was no military here.
Now, they collect a tax of 500 kyat [approximately
$0.40 USD] on every boat and 1000 kyat [approxi-
mately $0.80USD] on larger boats that go through
this town. Relief Worker, Female, Working in
Dedaye, Moulmeingyun, and Labutta Townships,
Irrawaddy Division (May 14, 2009)
Information
Difficulties in collecting and accessing reliable informa-
tion, particularly that which was necessary for needs
assessments and coordination of relief activities, was a
major concern for relief workers. This was exacerbated
by information released through the state-controlled
media outlets, which frequently minimized or obscured
the extent of the disaster or needs of the victims to cre-
ate the impression that the government’s relief efforts
were meeting the needs of survivors.
For the foreigner groups the authorities prevent
them from going to certain places and actually see-
ing the situation in the villages so they cannot actu-
ally get information from the people, only from the
authorities. For us, we go as a church group and we
are from that place so we can sit and talk with peo-
ple... The [Burmese] representatives of the donors
came to the village because if the donor is a for-
eigner then the authorities say there is some security
problem and the foreigner cannot go. They send a
representative again. The authorities allowed the
representative to take photographs, but only from
far away, no pictures up close and only from the
front view of the house. And the representative was
not allowed to talk with or ask questions of any of
the villagers. The reason for the pictures of the front
view is because they do the walls correctly in the
front, but on the sides and the back, as well as the
roof, they leave wide cracks in the walls. The floors
also are not made well. Even me, because I am a lit-
tle big, I am afraid to go into the houses because it
is very thin and it might become broken. Now some
houses are already damaged. Relief Worker, Male,
working in Labutta, Bogale, and Mawlamyinegyun
Townships, Irrawaddy Division (May 8, 2009)
The first time I went, the authorities knew we were
going there and we didn’t have any problems. But,
the next time we went, we went a different way to
get to the village and we had some problems. We
had three teams and three boats. On that way, one
of the teams met with soldiers from the army and
were stopped and questioned. But the other 2 came
back to the base office in time. When we all arrived
back in the place, in [location removed], the police
called all of us together to investigate. They brought
us to the playground. They asked us where we were
from and what we were doing, which organization
we were with, where we were going. They accepted
the relief aid, but they didn’t want us to collect the
lists of information on the population. They told us
to stop collecting the information on population and
the health situation... with the other authorities, we
didn’t meet any problems with them because the vil-
lagers gave us information on where the soldiers
were so we could avoid them. We avoided them
because if we met them they would surely ask us
questions about our work. For me, I didn’t have any
problems with my security. For our youth group, we
don’t worry about any situation for us, but for our
leaders, they worried about our safety and security
so they decided to stop our work. They were afraid
that the government authorities would arrest some
of us or all of us in the group for providing these
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services or because we were documenting population
information. Relief Worker, Male, working in
Labutta Township, Irrawaddy Division (May 7,
2009)
In every village now the authorities have placed
members of the “Swan Arr Shin” [Masters of Force]
or “Kyant Phut” [Union Solidarity and Development
Association, USDA; both are para-statal organiza-
tions implicated in violent attacks on regime oppo-
nents] group in each village. They try to make them
look like regular people, but really they are people
from the government, from the army. What they do
is the authorities have these people control the vil-
lage, listen to what is happening, try to stop any
activities they don’t like and they hope that it looks
like regular villagers stopping each other, but really
it is the soldiers. If someone comes to donate some-
thing, they tell the donor that because of security
they will do it themselves, but really it is to take the
donation and be able to control how it is used or
how the money is used... Only the villagers know
who these people, these informers, are but the
donors don’t know. They told the villagers not to
tell the donors who they are. They said that if the
villagers told the donors about them, they would
“take action.” They want everyone to think that they
are from the community, that they are normal villa-
gers. They said that if the villagers tell anything
about the work of the “suan ahn chin” that group
will stop all aid coming in and will arrest the people
responsible. They also threaten the community
before the donors come to see the donation of the
houses. They told the villagers that if the donors ask
anything, they have to say everything is good and
perfect and if they said any of the weak points, they
would take back the house and then arrest them
because the army came with the donor. This practice
of placing people from the army in plain clothes in
the villages started just after the cyclone and still
continues today. Relief worker, Male, Working in
Labutta, Bogale, and Mawlamyinegyun Town-
ships, Irrawaddy Division (May 8, 2009)
Distribution of Aid
Reports of discrimination in the delivery of aid as well
as misappropriation of aid was also often recounted by
respondents; in particular, supplies were required to go
through official channels for distribution, likely resulting
in a significant amount of donations not reaching its
intended recipients:
In one village, they had a project to build the houses
and when the materials arrived, the village leader
announced to the village that 1 person per family
had to go and help carry the items. For some people,
they didn’t have time to go so they have to find
someone and pay them to go in their place. This
was a donation..., they had to carry it to the village
leader’s house. Then the company that came to
build the houses they went to use these materials to
build the specific houses, as I said, these were for
the friends and family of the village leader, the sup-
plies were not shared among the community. This
was also in [name deleted] in Labutta. They had to
carry these supplies 2-3 days and received no food
or money for this work. Relief worker, Female,
Working in Labutta Township, Irrawaddy Divi-
sion (May 8, 2009)
Also, some people decided to leave because they had
no place to live so they decided to go away. But,
when they tried to come back, the village leader said
they could not come back because, after Nargis, they
had already left. In this situation, when they tem-
porarily lived in another village, that village did not
want to accept them. They told them to go back to
their own village, but when they went back to the
original village the chief villager refused to accept to
them. Even though they weren’t accepted, they
decided to stay in the village anyway, but when the
materials were distributed to build houses, they were
not allowed to get these materials. These people are
still living in temporary housing. This happened to
about 4 to5 families. At first, when they returned,
they didn’t get anything. Relief Worker, Female,
Working in Labutta Township, Irrawaddy Divi-
sion (May 5, 2009)
I have seen forms of discrimination in my area. Even
the donors give the same amount for everyone; the
village leaders divide it differently by dividing the vil-
lagers into rich and poor groups and distributing it
that way. Usually it is where the poor people are
receiving more than the rich. But people that are
closer to the authorities and government always get
more than everyone else. Survivor, Male, from
Kungyangon Township (May 3, 2009)
Land Confiscation
In some cases, efforts to rebuild livelihoods were further
threatened by the confiscation of survivors’ land, often
to benefit military-run reconstruction efforts as well as
for the material gain of the authorities:
During distribution time, though, most of the people
didn’t get houses. The people who received the
housing support were the people who gave dona-
tions to the chief, his relatives and those people who
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had good relationships with him. Only these people
received the new housing. So until now, most of the
villagers from there have to stay with a tarpaulin
shelter. But, this type of shelter is too hot for them
and when it’s raining it’s not safe for them. When
they built the new houses, though, the village leader
decided where the new houses would be built and a
lot of the time it was built on top of the villagers’
garden, the main garden area that they used for
their livelihood. There was no discussion about this,
but it was just done by the authorities. Also, they
were not given any financial compensation for their
land being taken. I don’t know how much land
exactly, how many Rai [1 Rai = 1600 sq. meters], but
I can say that it was a lot. This happened to most of
the villagers there, that their land was taken for new
buildings for other people - the people close to the
authorities. None of the villagers had any opportu-
nity to speak out against this. Relief Worker, Male,
Working in Labutta Township, Irrawaddy Divi-
sion (May 7, 2009)
Discussion and Conclusions
In 2006, in response to a lack of focus on human rights
protections following natural disasters, the UN Human
Rights Council issued the Report of the Representative of
the Secretary-General on human rights of internally dis-
placed persons [46]. The document recognized the
importance of human rights considerations in the con-
text of natural disasters and the humanitarian response:
5. Human rights are the legal underpinning of all
humanitarian work pertaining to natural disasters.
There is no other legal framework to guide such
activities, especially in areas where there is no armed
conflict. If humanitarian assistance is not based on a
human rights framework, it risks having too narrow
a focus and cannot integrate all the basic needs of
the victims into a holistic planning process. There is
also the risk that factors important for recovery and
reconstruction later on will be overlooked. Further,
neglecting the human rights of those affected by nat-
ural disasters effectively means no account will be
taken of the fact that such people do not live in a
legal vacuum. They live in countries with laws, rules
and institutions that should protect their rights.
The report and its addendum, the Operational Guide-
lines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters, also
underscored that protection of human rights and provi-
sion of assistance to the populations are the obligation
of the government of the affected country. Additionally,
the inclusion and consultation with individuals from the
affected community during the decision-making process
and implementation of relief activities are also funda-
mental principles set forth in this document. The
Operational Guidelines further noted the essential role
of community members in ensuring “effective, equitable,
and sustainable” relief and recovery programs [46,47].
The important role of local communities in disaster
responses was also recognized by ASEAN, of which
Burma is a member, that called for the promotion of
“public participation in programmes related to disaster
risk reduction and emergency responses in order to pro-
mote community resilience to disasters” and “partner-
ship with relevant stakeholders, including local
communities, non-governmental organisations and pri-
vate enterprises, and strengthen cooperation with United
Nationals and relevant international organisations”[48].
In the case of Burma, as reported here, community
members were among the first and most effective
responders during the crisis.
Unfortunately, as is reported here, there is consensus
that donor aid has been and continues to be inadequate
for the needs of the affected populations [36,49,50].
Many needs assessments and reports done in partner-
ship with the Burmese government, including reports
focused on the social impacts of the storm, have gener-
ally not reported on human rights issues, despite the
central role that this has been recognized to play[48,51].
The assessment and reporting of human rights concerns
is further limited by censorship, and the SPDC tightly
controls independent collection and dissemination of
information, including reporting on the needs of com-
munities[52,53]. In this context, private and independent
relief organizations such as EAT are in unique positions
to conduct rights investigations and play an essential
role to help ensure “effective, equitable, and sustainable”
relief and recovery programs[47]. As members of the
communities, they have physical access to the most
challenging, heavily-affected areas, especially those
where foreign aid access is restricted by the authorities.
And, as members of storm-affected communities, they
aroused less suspicion while traveling, were trusted by
the survivors and volunteer relief workers, and were
instrumental in gauging the priorities and needs of the
local people. Using participatory methods and operating
without the knowledge and consent of the Burmese
junta or its affiliated institutions, they were thus well-
positioned to serve as independent, community-level
monitors of human rights.
These assessments reveal that ongoing human rights
abuses have occurred in cyclone-affected areas in the
context of relief and reconstruction efforts. These
included official interference in relief efforts, harassment
and intimidation of private relief workers, misappropria-
tion and confiscation of aid, controls on information,
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confiscation of land from survivors, and forced labor.
Our findings show that the difference of having unhin-
dered access to affected communities and ensuring the
anonymity and confidentiality of those willing to testify
uncovers realities on the ground that stand in contrast
to evaluations conducted in partnership with the ruling
junta[27,48,51,54,55].
This assessment was subject to several limitations.
Due to security and logistical concerns, it was not possi-
ble to conduct a quantitative population-based assess-
ment in tandem with the qualitative human rights
investigation. As a result, estimations of the prevalence
of human rights abuses were not possible. In addition,
the disclosure of identifiers, such as specific village
names where the data were collected, was also impossi-
ble due to security considerations. To date, at least 21
individuals involved in private cyclone-related activities
have been arrested, none associated with this assess-
ment, and some have been sentenced to long prison
terms, underscoring the reality of these security con-
cerns in Burma[22]. At least eight additional community
activists and cyclone relief volunteers were sentenced to
long prison terms in January 2010[56]. Despite such lim-
itations, the use of in-depth interviews, however, offer
several strengths to the investigation. Foremost, inter-
views allow for an understating of the nuanced experi-
ences among survivors and relief workers. The use of
qualitative methods also allowed for refinement, addi-
tion of questions, and adjustment of the interview guide
when new themes emerged over time. Additionally, the
ability of the research team to use probes to collect
further details of experiences allowed for the verification
of veracity and internal consistency, as well as the
separation of personal experience from hearsay. An
additional limitation was the selected nature of the
interviewers and interviewees, and the potential biases
inherent in non-random sampling of participants. While
population-based approaches would arguably have gen-
erated more generalizable findings, this was not feasible
for logistical and security reasons; however, non-random
approaches, such as used in this investigation, should
not undermine the veracity of any individual experience
of abuse.
The limitations of this investigation should not detract
from the reality that independent community voices in
cyclone relief and reconstruction activities should be
encouraged. This is particularly important in countries
such as Burma, one of the most corrupt governments in
the world, and where widespread, systematic human
rights abuses of civilians has been widely documented,
including violations of several UN Conventions to which
Burma is signatory, such as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Eradi-
cation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), and the International Labour Organisation
Convention 29 on Forced Labour[17,57-59]. And, even
before Cyclone Nargis, strict limitations on international
humanitarian assistance, particularly information gather-
ing and travel for international staff, were a reality for
aid organizations[60,61]. Community-led monitoring of
human rights violations are an important part of asses-
sing responses to complex humanitarian emergencies,
particularly where states are unwilling to or have failed
to do so.
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